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New Concerns, More Cooperation?
How Non-Traditional Security Issues
Affect Sino–Indian Relations 
Sebastian BIBA 
China and India are not just the world’s two most populous countries – 
since the turn of the millennium, they have also become two jugger-
nauts driving much of the economic growth in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. Many believe the two countries are poised to become two of 
the leading players in the international arena in the future, possibly 
even doing away with Western predominance. However, while the 
two neighbours share multiple identities as great civilisations, devel-
oping countries, emerging economies, rising powers, and independent 
poles in a multipolar world, China and India have not been on par-
ticularly good terms with each other during most of the period since 
India’s independence from the British Empire in 1947 and the foun-
dation of the People’s Republic of China two years later. In fact, after 
a brief phase of “purported friendship and ideological congruence 
around anti-imperialist foreign policy objectives” (Malone and Muk-
herjee 2010: 138) in the early 1950s, the relationship deteriorated 
sharply, resulting in a short border war in 1962. Ever since then, bi-
lateral relations have been marked by uncertainty and occasional an-
tagonism. During the Cold War, India aligned itself more closely with 
the Soviet Union, which itself had split from China within the inter-
national communist movement. Meanwhile, China developed ever-
closer ties with Pakistan, the other half of the former British Raj, 
against which India has fought several wars. A rapprochement be-
tween China and India beginning during the Deng Xiaoping era from 
1978 remained uneasy, due, for instance, to further border skirmishes 
in the 1980s and Indian nuclear tests in 1998. Today, and certainly as 
a result of past experience, the two countries still face unresolved 
territorial disputes, suspicions over each other’s military build-up and 
strategic intent, and growing rivalries with regard to regional influence 
and great-power relations. These difficulties are the most well-known 
aspect of Sino–Indian relations; they are rooted in so-called “tradi-
tional security” (TS) problems, consisting primarily of interstate mili-
tary threats.   
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However, there is another aspect of the Sino–Indian security re-
lationship, one that is less known but not necessarily less important, 
and that revolves around the notion of “non-traditional security” 
(NTS). In contrast to TS concerns, NTS problems are no longer 
military in nature and comprise a set of very diverse issue areas rang-
ing, for example, from water and climate change to energy and fi-
nance to piracy and terrorism. This volume of the Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs explores some of those NTS issues that have more 
recently become increasingly significant in and for Sino–Indian rela-
tions. The overarching question driving the entire volume is rather 
straightforward: Do the rather new NTS issues echo the overall rela-
tively grim picture and maybe even aggravate the tensions prevalent 
in the TS context of Sino–Indian relations, or do they instead open 
up avenues for enhanced cooperation between the two sides – co-
operation which might even help alleviate some of the protracted TS 
problems and thus improve overall relations? In pursuing this ques-
tion, this volume goes beyond purely bilateral dynamics. Much of the 
potential for conflict or cooperation between China and India in the 
NTS realm is increasingly taking place on the regional and global 
multilateral levels. This is also reflected in the individual contribu-
tions. The objective of this introductory article is threefold: First, it 
provides a conceptual umbrella for the contributions of this issue and 
some background on the field of NTS research; second, it gives an 
overview of some of the NTS issues that have been particularly rele-
vant for Sino–Indian relations but are not covered by the individual 
contributions to this issue; and, third, it brings together the findings 
of the individual articles and formulates a few all-encompassing ob-
servations. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: The next 
section expands on conceptual matters, discussing what exactly NTS 
is and how it can be delimited from TS. In doing so, this section also 
delves into the critical question of why, theoretically speaking, the 
existence of NTS problems between China and India could prove to 
be a means of sparking more cooperation between them. I then brief-
ly introduce the major TS concerns and some of the NTS concerns 
prevalent in Sino–Indian relations. While the focus of this volume is 
on NTS issues, TS and NTS concerns are linked, as will become ob-
vious; one cannot analyse NTS issues in a vacuum. Subsequently, a 
brief summary of each of the four contributions in this issue is pro-
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vided. The final section carves out the commonalities of the individ-
ual articles’ key findings and draws a few additional conclusions. 
Traditional and Non-Traditional Security:  
A Conceptual Overview 
Any discussion of the differentiation between TS and NTS should 
probably start with a few remarks on the underlying core concept of 
security. What is security? As a matter of fact, this question already 
lies at the heart of all the conceptual ambiguities surrounding the 
term security and its derivative ideas. This is because “security is es-
sentially contested” (Smith 2005: 27) and  
there is, in short, no neutral place to stand to pronounce on the 
meaning of the concept of security, all definitions are theory-
dependent, and all definitions reflect normative commitments. 
(Smith 2005: 28)  
At the same time, however, it can also be argued that the meaning of 
security has become contested only during, and because of, the very 
developments and processes which have led scholars to speak today 
of different kinds of security such as TS and NTS.  
Against this backdrop, we can describe how security used to be 
defined, and what is meant by what is now commonly referred to as 
TS. In its simplest form, and grounded in realist thinking, security 
used to be the absence, or at least the alleviation, of threats, with 
threats being possible developments that could be harmful if they 
were to occur someday in the future (see, for example, Williams 2008: 5). 
Two additional things were critical, though, with regard to this rather 
abstract understanding of security: First, the only threats recognised 
as such were military in nature. Accordingly, Bellamy has provided a 
well-known definition of security that labels it “a relative freedom 
from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will 
not be a consequence of any war that should occur” (Bellamy 1981: 102). 
Second, and in correspondence with Bellamy’s war-based definition 
of security, military threats originated only from states and targeted 
other states. Military threats were then regarded as harmful to a state 
when they impinged on its survival or at least its physical safety – that 
is, when they encroached on its sovereignty or territorial integrity 
(Seidelmann 2011: 107–108). In sum, the old, or traditional, notion of 
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security was, and still is, framed in terms of national security, pivoting 
on state-to-state interactions on the one hand and military threats on 
the other.  
Meanwhile, it was exactly these two pillars of this rather narrow 
conceptualisation of national security – military-centrism and state-
centrism – that contained the seeds of critique of the TS concept and 
spurred its contested evolution. Two developments are particularly 
noteworthy – namely, (1) the broadening and (2) the deepening of the 
meaning of security (see, for example, Smith 2005: 29). Broadening 
refers to a position which has sought to expand the concept of secur-
ity areas beyond the military dimension. The empirical origin of those 
conceptual considerations is linked to the rise in the West of econom-
ic and environmental agendas during the 1970s and 1980s. While the 
former were triggered by the oil shocks in 1973 and in 1979, which 
showed the West how vulnerable their economies were to interrup-
tions in foreign energy supplies, the latter were finally brought to full 
attention by the Brundtland Report in 1987, which highlighted con-
cerns of global ecological deterioration. In Asia, Japan coined the 
term “comprehensive security” in 1978 as a new policy framework 
and a pragmatic response to the problems of an increasingly complex 
international environment. The doctrine of comprehensive security 
embraced different functional areas of security (e.g. economic, mili-
tary, and political) and defined security policy in terms of its various 
levels: domestic, bilateral, regional, and global (Dewitt 1994: 2–3). In 
the academic literature, security-related developments in the changing 
policy environment of the 1980s were first taken up in a comprehen-
sive manner by Barry Buzan in his seminal 1983 book People, States, 
and Fear. The key move made by Buzan in his book was to broaden 
the security agenda by adding four additional sectors to the traditional 
military one. The new sectors were the political, economic, societal, 
and ecological security sectors.  
Deepening implies opening up the issue of who the referent ob-
jects of security are, leading to a discussion of actors other than the 
state. Most prominent in terms of deepening the meaning of security 
in the aftermath of the Cold War was perhaps the emergence of the 
concept of human security, which shifted the reference object from 
the state to the individual. The human security concept rose to prom-
inence in the debates following the United Nations Development 
Programme’s Human Development Report 1994. The report outlined 
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seven areas of human security: economic security, food security, 
health security, environmental security, personal security, community 
security, and political security (UNDP 1994: 24–25). It also identified 
six main threats to human security: unchecked population growth, 
disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environ-
mental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism 
(UNDP 1994: 34). In general, the shift away from the state as the 
referent object of security – a move which has been promoted 
throughout the more critical security studies literature – has to be 
seen as the questioning of the state’s image as a security provider for 
its people and, simultaneously, the acknowledgement of the possibil-
ity that the state can also be a source of insecurity for its own people 
(see, for example, Jones 1995: 310). 
An excellent summary of the controversial debates about today’s 
“extended” concept of security comes from Rothschild and deserves 
to be quoted in full: 
The extension takes four main forms. In the first, the concept of 
security is extended from the security of nations to the security of 
groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to 
individuals. In the second, it is extended from the security of na-
tions to the security of the international system, or of a suprana-
tional physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the na-
tion to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts 
of entities whose security is to be ensured. In the third operation, 
the concept of security is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of 
security that are in question. Different entities (such as individuals, 
nations, and “systems”) cannot be expected to be secure or inse-
cure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, there-
fore, from military, to political, economic, social, environmental, 
or “human” security. In the fourth operation, the political respon-
sibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these “concepts 
of security”) is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from 
national states, including upwards to international institutions, 
downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to non-
governmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and 
to the abstract forces of nature or of the market. (Rothschild 
1995: 55) 
What does all this tell us about the exact meaning of NTS, though? Is 
it simply that NTS is everything that TS is not? If that is the case, 
how can NTS be linked to and delimited from notions such as com-
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prehensive security and human security? In Asia at least, “there is 
now a growing trend to highlight any security concern that is non-
military in nature […] under the label of NTS” (Caballero-Anthony 
2008: 508). On the one hand, this is exactly what opponents of an 
extended security concept have long feared and criticised. In the 
opinion of those critics, if the concept of security includes any threat, 
this not only dilutes the concern surrounding military threats, but also 
decreases the analytical utility of the concept so that it ultimately be-
comes meaningless (Seidelmann 2011). On the other hand, however, 
proponents of the concept of NTS have maintained that the appro-
priation of the security label for concerns other than military ones has 
been a significant development, in that security framing is seen as an 
effective way to bring attention to these NTS challenges, convey 
urgency, and command governmental resources to address them 
(Caballero-Anthony 2008: 509). Besides, the proponents highlight 
that NTS threats are proving to be more severe and more likely to 
cause more harm to a larger number of people than traditional threats 
of interstate wars and armed conflicts (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 
2013: 1). 
To help with the conceptualisation of NTS, the Consortium on 
Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia has defined NTS issues as 
those that  
challenge the survival and well-being of peoples and states that 
arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, 
resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular 
migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transna-
tional crime. (Cited in Caballero-Anthony 2008: 510) 
This definition provides a helpful indication of where to locate the 
notion of NTS among its related concepts. One way could be to re-
gard NTS as a subset of comprehensive security that characteristically 
and primarily requires non-military responses to address security 
threats (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013: 5). However, compre-
hensive security has never dissociated itself from the state as the sole 
referent object of security, whereas the above definition of NTS 
speaks of peoples and states as possible referent objects. In fact, this 
is part of the reason why the concept of comprehensive security lost 
currency in Asia in the course of the 1990s (Caballero-Anthony 2008: 
509). Another way of locating NTS could be to argue that while human 
security draws attention to a number of insecurities faced by individ-
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uals and communities, NTS could in fact be the broader umbrella 
under which emerging threats facing states, individuals, and commu-
nities, all as objects of security, can be brought (Caballero-Anthony 
and Cook 2013: 5). In any case, the two key aspects in the definition 
of NTS are certainly as follows: First, the concept of NTS is fully in 
line with the broadening of the security concept, while it, significant-
ly, basically excludes the military dimension (whereby issues such as 
terrorism and piracy certainly represent a conceptual grey area). Sec-
ond, the concept of NTS also corresponds with the deepening of the 
meaning of security, while it is, in this regard, not so rigid as to reject 
the state as one of the possible referent objects. This is a particularly 
important finding when it comes to the Asian context, where the way 
countries’ governments view NTS has in fact remained largely state-
centric. 
Apart from their non-military nature, NTS problems share a few 
other essential characteristics: NTS threats tend to be (1) transnation-
al in scope, (2) difficult to prevent, and (3) resistant to national solu-
tions (Caballero-Anthony 2009: 310). They are also often interwoven 
and mutually influential. To be sure, however, the extent to which 
these common characteristics really reflect the features of every single 
NTS concern also depends on the question of what issues actually fall 
into the category of NTS. Consensus on an “objective” list of NTS 
issues has yet to be reached, though, as NTS issues are generally con-
textually defined (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013: 5). Therefore, 
the group of potential NTS concerns is not only very large, but also 
quite diverse. The issues listed in the above-cited definition of NTS 
clearly indicate this. As a result, some of the more specific features of 
two different NTS issues may vary from each other to a considerable 
extent. 
Nevertheless, identifying a few common features is valuable in 
that it helps to further delimit NTS problems from TS concerns: 
Military TS problems are straightforwardly state-to-state – that is, 
international in terms of scope. From the perspective of one particu-
lar state, TS problems can therefore be prevented – for example, 
through deterrence – or they can be solved unilaterally, through mili-
tary means. The more military power a state can accumulate, the 
more secure it will be. NTS concerns, in contrast, are commonly 
transnational in scope. That is to say, they are neither purely domestic 
nor purely interstate. Rather, they may emerge locally and then travel 
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across national borders. Moreover, due to their non-military and in-
stead sociopolitical, socio-economic, or environmental nature, NTS 
issues are usually much harder to prevent than TS threats. Instead of 
preventative measures, they usually require mitigation and adaptation 
measures. Last, because of their transnational scope, NTS concerns 
cannot generally be resolved in a unilateral fashion. Rather, tackling 
NTS problems effectively requires cooperation, often in a regional 
and multilateral manner. Additionally, as NTS problems are non-
military in nature, the solutions likewise tend to be non-military (apart 
from humanitarian aspects of military support) (also see Table 1).  
Table 1. Comparison of Key Features of Traditional and Non-Traditional 
Security  
 Traditional Security Non-Traditional Security 
Theoretical 
foundations 
Realism (and liberal-
ism) 
Critical approaches (e.g. Copenhagen 
School and Welsh School) 
Type of threat Military  Non-military (e.g. sociopolitical, 
socio-economic, and environmental)  
Referent 
object 
State Community (may include states) and 
individual  
Incentive  
(What’s to 
gain/lose?) 
Survival and physical 
safety of the state  
See TS plus human survival, well-
being, and dignity 
Scope International  Transnational 
Prevention Possible (e.g. deter-
rence) 
Difficult; mitigation and adaptation 
Solution Diplomatic and mili-
tary; does not require 
cooperation 
Non-military; requires cooperation  
This last point about the requirement for cooperation in order to 
solve NTS threats is a fundamental one, also with regard to the objec-
tive of this volume and its individual contributions. It is this point 
which lays the theoretical-conceptual foundation for arguing that 
states that share common NTS concerns tend to transform those 
concerns into a catalyst for new forms of cooperation between them, 
when then possibly even spill over into more traditional security 
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problems which are usually associated with an increased potential for 
conflict. In fact, similar arguments about NTS have been made in the 
Asian context several times. For example, Caballero-Anthony has 
contended that  
as NTS issues increasingly define states’ security agendas, the 
emergence of new cooperative mechanisms and the recalibration 
of existing institutions to address these challenges are pushing re-
gional actors for deeper institutional commitments, including the 
adoption of more rules-based regimes, to ensure more effective 
implementation of regional measures and to enhance security co-
operation in East Asia. (Caballero-Anthony 2009: 307) 
In a similar vein, Caballero-Anthony and Cook have emphasised, 
since many of [the NTS] challenges are transnational, states tend 
to draw closer and establish institutional and procedural arrange-
ments to respond to what are often complex security challenges. 
As a consequence, there is a noticeable trend among state and 
non-state actors [in East Asia] to turn to regional and multilevel 
relationships as a preferred framework to respond to trans-border 
and non-traditional security problems. (Caballero-Anthony and 
Cook 2013: 2) 
Even concerning the very tricky international relations context in 
Northeast Asia, featuring various complex security relations between 
the key players of China, Japan, and the two Koreas, Cui has held 
that 
NTS cooperation has already emerged as an important element in 
Northeast Asian regional cooperation since the mid-1990s. In the 
processes some new norms, institutions and patterns of behaviour 
are starting to appear, gradually altering its character and promot-
ing the emergence of a collective identity that is conducive to re-
gional integration. (Cui 2013: 869) 
The question is whether similar trends can also be witnessed between 
China and India. Before looking into this matter, however, it is useful 
to call to mind what TS problems exist in the Sino–Indian relation-
ship. 
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Traditional Security Problems in Sino–Indian 
Relations – A Brief Outline
It is conspicuous that observers of Sino–Indian relations unanimous-
ly come to the conclusion that the bilateral relationship between these 
two rising powers has, at its core, been plagued by mutual suspicion 
and a lack of trust. The root cause of this – and here again, there is 
hardly any disagreement – has been the long-standing border dispute 
between China and India in the Himalayas. While a Line of Actual 
Control (LAC) demarcates an effective border, in the disputed west-
ern border sector this line runs along the southern part of the Aksai 
Chin region, which is controlled by China but claimed by India. In 
addition to these approximately 38,000 square kilometres in Aksai 
Chin, Pakistan ceded some 5,000 square kilometres of Indian-claimed 
territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China under the so-called 
China–Pakistan “Boundary Agreement” of 1963. Conversely, in the 
disputed eastern sector, the LAC runs along the northern part of the 
Indian state Arunachal Pradesh, which is not recognised by China, as 
Beijing itself claims some 90,000 square kilometres of Indian territory 
in this area (Global Security 2016). The LAC was informally delineat-
ed after the 1962 Sino–Indian border war and then officially accepted 
in a bilateral agreement in 1993. However, the LAC remains ill-defin-
ed due to different perceptions of the demarcation, and the countries 
have yet to agree on an official boundary (Southerland, Koch-Weser, 
and Zhang 2014: 3). Ever since 1962, the border areas between China 
and India have witnessed repeated low-level confrontations such as 
military standoffs and temporary border crossings. This has happened 
alongside various cautious attempts at border management and con-
fidence building. A primary reason that a final solution has not yet 
been reached seems to be related to the intractability of the issue, 
which has only strengthened fundamental mutual distrust. Also, do-
mestic politics, including heightened nationalism and rabble-rousing 
media coverage on both sides, has prevented either side from making 
any concessions (Global Security 2016). In fact, both China and India 
seem to be hardening their positions along the border, as both sides 
have of late ramped up their infrastructure projects in border regions 
(Bajpaee 2015: 112).  
What is more, the unresolved border issue relates to two other 
thorns in Sino–Indian relations – namely, Tibet and Pakistan. Tibet, 
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to begin with, has actually been a factor in the China–India relation-
ship since even before the 1962 border war. Following China’s occu-
pation of Tibet in the early 1950s and the escape of the 14th Dalai 
Lama, Tibet’s political and spiritual leader, from Tibet to India in 
1959 to avoid Beijing’s crackdown on a popular armed revolt against 
Chinese rule in Lhasa, the Tibet issue has repeatedly created tensions 
between India and China. For one thing, China fears India could take 
advantage of the presence of the Dalai Lama and the large Tibetan 
refugee population in India and try to foment unrest in Tibet. In 
addition, the future successor of the 81-year-old Dalai Lama has the 
potential to complicate China–India relations. This is because while 
the Dalai Lama has suggested that he might nominate his successor 
and that he might not even have one, the Chinese side has maintained 
that only Beijing has the power to select the Dalai Lama. Additionally, 
Beijing is concerned that the death of the 14th Dalai Lama might 
pave the way for the rise of a new generation of more radical Tibetan 
leaders who will embrace less conciliatory positions towards the Chi-
nese government. Together with the rekindled instability in ethnically 
Tibetan areas since 2008, all of this has impelled China to reaffirm its 
sovereignty over the Tibet Autonomous Region and to adopt a more 
rigorous position regarding its claim to Arunachal Pradesh (Bajpaee 
2015: 113; Southerland, Koch-Weser, and Zhang 2014: 8). 
Pakistan has also constituted a long-time irritant in Sino–Indian 
relations. With regard to the border dispute, this is reflected in the 
fact that Chinese infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kash-
mir indicate the implicit Chinese acceptance of Pakistan’s claim to the 
territory, which is disputed with India. This interpretation was con-
solidated by the conclusion of an agreement in April 2015 to launch 
the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, parts of which also run 
through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Bajpaee 2015: 113). However, 
this is not the only problem Pakistan represents for the China–India 
relationship. Speaking more generally, India’s bitter rivalry with Paki-
stan has long rendered China’s coincident all-weather friendship with 
Pakistan, which began in the 1950s, a source of tension between Chi-
na and India. While China and Pakistan’s bilateral relationship serves 
each country as a means of strategic and military balancing against 
India, China’s strong ties with Pakistan speak to Indian fears that 
China is seeking to encircle India. India is particularly worried about 
China’s support for Pakistan’s military through arms sales and tech-
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nology transfers. China is not only Pakistan’s top source of arms 
imports in general, it also seems to have played a crucial role in Paki-
stan’s attainment of nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles in particu-
lar (Southerland, Koch-Weser, and Zhang 2014: 7). 
Some of the dynamics involved in Chinese–Indian–Pakistani tri-
angular relations are also emblematic of another overarching issue in 
the China–India relationship – apart from the border dispute and the 
related concerns. This issue could be summarised as emerging-great-
power rivalry and geostrategic competition, taking place primarily on 
the regional level. One key expression of this trend is the fact that 
both sides have established a growing presence along each other’s 
peripheries. China has in recent years continuously strengthened its 
economic and political ties with several of India’s direct neighbours, 
such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. This has result-
ed in India’s perception that it is being increasingly encircled by Chi-
na. However, India has likewise reached out to and deepened its rela-
tionships with Vietnam and Japan, both of which are China’s tradi-
tional regional adversaries. In addition, India has for strategic reasons 
tilted closer to the United States in order to balance China’s rise, 
thereby striking a nerve in Beijing (Bajpaee 2015: 117).  
Generally speaking, China and India’s vying for regional influ-
ence can be witnessed in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South 
Asia. The most prominent arena, however, where Sino–Indian re-
gional competition has played out so far is probably the maritime 
domain covering the Indo-Pacific region. The region provides sea 
trade routes connecting Africa and the Middle East with South Asia 
and the broader Asian continent to the east and is home to a number 
of the world’s most important strategic choke points, such as the 
Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. In order to protect their 
overseas interests so as to maintain economic growth at home and 
increase national power, both China and India have accelerated the 
expansion of their navies and enhanced their naval deployments in 
the Indo-Pacific region. On the one hand, while India sees itself as 
the natural predominant power in the Indian Ocean, China is regard-
ed by many Indians to be setting up a so-called “String of Pearls” in 
India’s immediate coastal neighbourhood, which implies that Beijing 
has sought to secure ports or places where its military forces could set 
up naval facilities or, at the very least, refuelling and repair stations. 
On the other hand, as part of its Act East Policy, India has more 
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recently dispatched vessels to the disputed waters in the South China 
Sea and supported US calls for freedom of navigation and the peace-
ful resolution of the territorial disputes, thereby rattling China’s cage 
(Albert 2016). 
In sum, then, the Sino–Indian relationship is fraught with several 
intractable security problems featuring TS characteristics. These prob-
lems hold high potential for conflict between China and India and 
have made bilateral relations not only complicated, but also volatile.  
Non-Traditional Security in Sino–Indian  
Relations – A Selection of Issues 
Just as Sino–Indian relations continue to be troubled by several pro-
tracted TS problems with a high potential for conflict, the relation-
ship between the two countries is also increasingly characterised by a 
host of common NTS issues. These might promote enhanced Sino–
Indian cooperation and thus potentially help overcome mutual dis-
trust, thereby having a positive effect on the long-standing TS threats. 
The contributions to this volume delve into NTS matters such as 
economic and financial issues, piracy, and religion in the form of 
Buddhism (see also the next section). The following selection of NTS 
concerns in Sino–Indian relations therefore focuses on a few note-
worthy issue areas not tackled specifically by the individual articles of 
this volume. These are the water–food–energy nexus, climate change, 
and terrorism. 
To begin with, water, food and energy resources cannot be sepa-
rated from each other, as freshwater resources are essential for pro-
ducing food and energy, while energy is needed to move, distribute, 
and treat water as well as to grow food. This is what has in recent 
years been described as a nexus between these resources (WEF 2011). 
However, the declining availability of freshwater resources is of grave 
concern for both China and India. In the period from 1962 to 2014, 
the yearly amount of total renewable water resources in China and 
India has decreased from 4,175 and 4,083 cubic metres per person to 
2,018 and 1,458 cubic metres per person, respectively (FAO 2016). 
As a result, China has already come quite close to the official United 
Nations threshold for “water stress,” which stands at 1,700 cubic 
metres per inhabitant annually, while India has even dropped below 
it. However, such figures still hide the real extent of water shortages 
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in both countries. Together, China and India are home to 37 per cent 
of the world’s population but have less than 11 per cent of global 
freshwater resources at their disposal (Chellaney 2011: 4). The Chi-
nese government has classified nearly half of its 600 largest cities as 
being short of water. The annual urban freshwater shortage is esti-
mated at 5–6 billion cubic metres, while irrigated areas are experienc-
ing shortages of 30–35 billion cubic metres per year. Meanwhile, 
water use in China has been surging, with urban and industrial de-
mand growing at respective annual rates of 10.1 and 5.4 per cent. On 
top of that, more than 75 per cent of the river water running through 
urban areas is considered unsuitable for drinking or fishing, and ap-
proximately 30 per cent of the river water throughout the country is 
deemed to be unfit for use in agriculture or industry (Biba 2016: 54). 
Similarly, in India, 22 of the 32 major cities face daily water shortages, 
with gaps between demand and supply reaching up to 70 per cent 
(Times of India 2013). Additionally, an alarming 80 per cent of India’s 
surface water is polluted (Times of India 2015). Both China and India 
are also extracting groundwater much more quickly than it can be 
replenished, China by 25 per cent and India by 56 per cent (WEF 
2011: 9). 
What is more, while water availability in China and India has de-
creased sharply, the food demand in the two countries has risen 
enormously, resulting in even greater demand for water resources. It 
takes about 10 times more water to raise a kilogram of beef than to 
grow a kilogram of rice or wheat, and China’s meat consumption has 
increased fourfold since the 1980s and is anticipated to double again 
by 2030. India’s grain demand is projected to total between 382 and 
over 450 million tons by 2050; the current demand only amounts to 
234 million tons (Biba 2016: 56). Meanwhile, China and India regard 
self-sufficiency in grain production, together with affordable rice or 
wheat for their large populations, as a strategic priority in order to 
guarantee social and political stability domestically. Today, China and 
India alone produce and consume approximately half of the world’s 
entire rice supply (Chellaney 2011: 34). As a result, and also because 
of largely inefficient irrigation practices, an incredible 91 per cent of 
India’s water withdrawal is for agriculture. In China, this figure stands 
at above 70 per cent (Chellaney 2011: 200). 
The picture has hardly been different with regard to energy. Chi-
na’s total primary energy consumption has more than quadrupled 
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since 1980, and India’s has more than doubled since 1990. According 
to projections, the two countries will account for approximately half 
of global energy demand growth up to 2040. Against this backdrop, 
and given both countries’ current dependence on oil imports, it 
seems natural that both countries should be seeking to diversify their 
energy mixes, especially by raising the percentage of renewable energy 
resources in their portfolios. One key component in this regard is 
hydropower development. China has set the goal of producing at 
least 15 per cent of its overall energy from renewables, mostly hydro-
power, by 2020. In 2010, it ranked number one worldwide in terms 
of its share of hydroelectricity consumption, at some 21 per cent. In 
2012, hydropower accounted for 22 per cent of China’s installed 
electricity capacity. Likewise, India has also sought to increase its 
hydropower potential, only 29 per cent of which is currently devel-
oped. India was the seventh-largest producer globally of hydroelectric 
power in 2012, and hydropower is the second-largest source of elec-
tricity in the country (Biba 2016: 55).  
While both China and India thus exhibit very similar domestic 
trends regarding the supply of and demand for their water, food, and 
energy resources, the question is still what makes these trends an 
element of their bilateral relationship. Two related things make this 
link rather plain: First, water is the gossamer in the nexus with food 
and energy, playing a key role. Second, China and India share several 
rivers, including major watercourses such as the Brahmaputra, Indus, 
and Sutlej. China’s and India’s fates are therefore tied together to 
some extent when it comes to fresh water. However, in all of their 
shared rivers, China is upstream and India downstream, which there-
by creates an asymmetric relationship. To a large extent, this constel-
lation explains why India has a relatively high water dependency ratio 
(i.e. the ratio of incoming water to total renewable water resources) of 
approximately 30 per cent, with most of the water flowing into the 
country from China (Biba 2014: 24). Meanwhile, the Brahmaputra 
alone, as the most important shared river between China and India, 
accounts for 29 per cent of the total run-off of India’s rivers, and of 
India’s total hydropower potential, roughly 44 per cent lies in the 
Brahmaputra basin (Biba 2014: 37). All of this illustrates nicely that 
water resources – and with them food and energy resources – are a 
prime NTS concern in Sino–Indian relations. 
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Any consideration of decreasing water resources is not far re-
moved from issues of climate change. As a matter of fact, climate 
change has been identified as one of the critical global trends impact-
ing, often adversely, the water–food–energy nexus (SEI 2011). For 
the China–India dyad, climate change plays a considerable role in two 
regards: The first is the global theatre. China and India are, respec-
tively, the world’s largest and third-largest greenhouse gas emitters. 
This implies that all necessary global efforts for climate change miti-
gation cannot succeed without the positive contribution of both Chi-
na and India. However, under the current international climate 
change regime, the Kyoto Protocol, China and India have been in the 
group of so-called “Annex II Countries” (i.e. developing countries), 
which are exempt from any legally binding obligations to reduce 
emissions (Wu 2012: 827–828). This has long resulted in international 
pressure on China and India to accept legally binding reduction tar-
gets. Very recently, both countries signed and ratified the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol which is 
meant to govern emission reductions from 2020 on. The second way 
climate change plays a role is in terms of the regional theatre. Here, 
the issue mainly revolves around climate change on the “Third Pole” 
(i.e. the Himalayas), which covers parts of both China and India. 
Because of its extremely high elevation, this region is warming faster 
and earlier than the surrounding lowlands. Over the last three dec-
ades, the average temperature on the plateau has increased by 1 de-
gree Celsius, and predictions show a likely further rise of 2.0 to 2.6 
degrees Celsius by 2050 (Morton 2011: 121). The consequences for 
the countries in the region, including China and India, will be dire. 
Estimates have suggested that one-third of Himalayan glaciers could 
be gone by 2050, and two-thirds by 2100. However, the gigantic glac-
iers on the Third Pole feed rivers which collectively supply most of 
the water for China and India’s large populations. Over the short to 
medium term, higher temperatures will increase flooding in the rainy 
seasons and reduce water in the dry seasons. Eventually, water short-
ages are likely to occur on a massive scale (Biba 2016: 57). Morton 
has suggested, in summary, that  
the retreat of the glaciers [in the Himalayas] is likely to have dra-
matic adverse effects on biodiversity, people and livelihoods in 
East, South, and Southeast Asia, with long-term implications for 
water, food and energy security. […] Glacial melt also triggers a 
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higher incidence of natural disasters – landslides, flooding and gla-
cial-lake outbursts – that can, in turn, lead to internal displacement 
and the destruction of critical infrastructure. (Morton 2011: 123–
124) 
A final NTS issue, which is also a critical part of bilateral relations 
between China and India, is terrorism. Just as China and India are 
both faced with the negative implications of climate change, neither 
country is immune to terrorism. On the one hand, both countries are 
grappling with the issue of domestic terrorism. For China, this pri-
marily relates to the fight against “terrorism intended for separatism” 
(Hao and Liu 2012: 208) in its western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region. In particular, the Chinese government has accused the East 
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) of being responsible for repeat-
ed violent terrorist incidents, carried out in hopes of gaining inde-
pendence from Beijing (Hao and Liu 2012). In India, the picture has 
been more complex, with different kinds of terrorist movements 
being active at different times and in different places (SATP 2016a). 
Recently, though, secessionist terrorism in the Jammu and Kashmir 
regions has been seen as the most prominent threat (SATP 2016b). 
Also, this kind of terrorism has often been said to be sponsored by 
the Pakistani state, including the latest terrorist attack on 19 Septem-
ber this year (Huffington Post 2016). Consequently, on the other hand, 
there is the issue of inter- or transnational terrorism. This variant is 
also what makes terrorism a common NTS concern for China and 
India. More precisely, it is the fear in both countries that domestic 
terrorism could establish links to, and gain strength from, regional 
and global terrorist networks in order to jointly destabilise China’s 
and India’s peripheries. Several neighbouring countries of China and 
India, especially Pakistan, Afghanistan, and some Central Asian re-
publics, suffer from grave political instabilities and are home to vari-
ous radical Islamic groupings with close cultural and ideological ties 
to terrorist movements in China and India. China, for instance, has 
previously claimed that ETIM maintains relations with Al-Qaeda. 
Beijing’s plans to revive the ancient Silk Road across Eurasia, through 
the dangerous territories of its western neighbours, will only expose 
China to more risk, as a suicide attack in August this year on the Chi-
nese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, demonstrated (Beech 2016). 
The question of how much China and India have actually lived 
up to the potential for enhanced cooperation inherent in all these 
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common NTS concerns is answered below, following a summary of 
the individual contributions to this volume, the findings of which are 
also incorporated into the final analysis.  
Summary of Individual Contributions 
Each article in this volume provides a fascinating and (largely) empir-
ical case study of one or more of the specific NTS concerns affecting 
the Sino–Indian relationship at the regional or global level, either 
bilaterally or multilaterally. As NTS issues in China–India relations 
tend to be under-researched, each contribution brings to light new 
and exciting facets of this important dyad. While their methodological 
and conceptual approaches may differ, all articles in this volume ana-
lyse the question of whether NTS concerns have led to heightened 
competition or, rather, have driven increased cooperation between 
China and India. The following brief summaries of the individual 
contributions capture some elements of this question, but in no way 
do justice to the actual empirical and analytical richness of each article. 
In his contribution, Jingdong Yuan explores the economics–
security nexus in China–India relations and asks, among other things, 
how and to what extent economic interdependence has had a positive 
effect on security and, thus, been conducive to improving overall 
bilateral relations. His findings paint a highly ambiguous picture. On 
the one hand, bilateral trade ties have grown substantially since the 
1980s, with much more potential for further growth. On the other 
hand, though, India complains about the permanent and worsening 
trade deficit with China as well as about the composition of traded 
goods, whereby India largely exports raw materials and imports most-
ly manufactured items. Additionally, the bilateral investment level 
remains low, often due to market access restrictions. Similar ambigui-
ties exist on the multilateral level vis-à-vis the subregional economic 
cooperation through the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Eco-
nomic Corridor (BCIM-EC). On the one hand, if the BCIM-EC 
could eventually gain more momentum, it would most certainly allow 
the four countries to exploit and benefit from the existing comple-
mentarity in their respective natural endowments – especially in ener-
gy, transport, and trade. On the other hand, however, India fears 
China’s likely domination of the mechanism. Moreover, such con-
cerns have been aggravated by suspicions over Beijing’s grand Mari-
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time Silk Road plans, which have sometimes been interpreted in New 
Delhi as the economic variant of China’s String of Pearls scheme. 
Recognising these complexities, Yuan concludes that possible win-
win scenarios based on economic interdependence have yet to ma-
terialise, while economic ties between China and India remain as 
competitive as they are complementary. As a key reason for this di-
chotomous economic relationship, Yuan sees strategic mistrust nur-
tured by thorny TS issues such as the unresolved border dispute. 
In Asif Farooq and Andrew Cooper’s article, the focus on NTS 
in Sino–Indian relations is often more implicit, with considerations 
about financial security resonating mostly in the background. The 
primary objective of the piece is to elaborate on China’s and India’s 
respective approaches to the G20 and BRICS, and to thereby assess 
the countries’ commonalities and the extent to which they pursue 
competitive behaviour in these two multilateral fora on the transre-
gional (BRICS) and global (G20) levels. Whereas one might assume 
that this bigger frame would contain bilateral rivalry between China 
and India, Farooq and Cooper’s findings suggest that in reality things 
are more complicated. In the case of the New Development Bank, 
both China and India have tried to gain the upper hand and put the 
other side on the defence by making proposals that would further 
their own political interests, thus indicating a combination of hedging 
and status-seeking behaviour. Furthermore, while India has been 
circumspect in stimulating any shift within BRICS towards a greater 
security orientation, China has embraced some initiatives towards an 
NTS agenda beyond financial security, especially by linking the eco-
nomic agenda driven by BRICS and the security agenda (including 
energy and terrorism) driven by the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO). When it comes to the G20, the different Chinese and 
Indian priorities are likewise pronounced. Whereas China has turned 
into a much more active and adaptive player, India has remained in 
catch-up mode, with its focus on a backward-looking agenda privileg-
ing the United Nations and a development model emphasising soli-
darity between India and the Global South. As a result, according to 
Farooq and Cooper, there is a lack of any meaningful mutual cooper-
ation between China and India in influencing the G20. 
Olivia Gippner’s article returns to the Asian regional theatre and 
examines questions of maritime security in the Indian Ocean and its 
major sea lanes through the prism of anti-piracy cooperation between 
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China and India. More precisely, Gippner poses the question of 
whether the Gulf of Aden and the broader Indian Ocean, where pir-
ate activities threaten vital shipping routes for both China and India, 
will emerge as an area of cooperation or competition between Beijing 
and New Delhi. Conceptually, the article frames anti-piracy activities 
as a low-risk NTS issue on which collective action can create a plat-
form for confidence-building measures in great-power relations. The 
idea behind such measures is that more interaction, during which 
countries expose their naval capabilities in a cooperative manner, 
increases transparency and thus promotes trust and confidence be-
tween the two adversaries. With regard to the success of this idea, 
however, the article arrives at the conclusion that anti-piracy efforts 
have in effect functioned as a platform for both cooperation and 
competition between China and India. On the one hand, joint train-
ing exercises and both countries’ participation in multilateral mecha-
nisms (together with NATO and the European Union) have symbol-
ised a certain rapprochement between Beijing and New Delhi. On the 
other hand, however, India continues to feel threatened by the Chi-
nese presence in the Indian Ocean. Put differently, anti-piracy co-
operation involving Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean is 
perceived by India as an invasion of its area of dominance. Anti-
piracy cooperation therefore concomitantly amplifies Indian concerns 
over a Chinese encirclement strategy. Consequently, according to the 
article, there remain obvious limits to what could be a win-win situa-
tion. 
Last but not least, David Scott turns our attention to a frequently 
underestimated NTS concern – namely, religion. More specifically, 
Scott’s piece dissects the role currently played by Buddhism as a pub-
lic/cultural diplomacy tool for both China and India to conduct bilat-
eral relations with each other as well as to increase their respective 
soft-power resources in their bilateral relations with third countries. 
Scott’s findings are very straightforward, and yet ambiguous. Bud-
dhism has, to some extent, served as a bridge in the Sino–Indian 
relationship. For both countries, Buddhism constitutes an important 
source of nation branding, as India can claim to be the birthplace of 
Buddhism, while China has long had the biggest number of Buddhist 
adherents. In their bilateral relationship, Buddhism is used to empha-
sise the historical cultural linkages between the two countries; the 
religion’s peaceful character has been invoked by officials on both 
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sides as a model for the contemporary relationship. However, Bud-
dhism has actually engendered greater competition between China 
and India. Divisions are particularly deep over Tibetan Buddhism. 
Here, Buddhism affects the moral legitimacy and ongoing insecurity 
of China’s political control over Tibet, as China remains hypersensi-
tive to foreign influence because of worries that its security grip on 
Tibetan Buddhism might be weakened. Moreover, competitive fea-
tures are also noticeable in Sino–Indian conduct with third countries, 
as both China and India have resorted to Buddhism in order to influ-
ence countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. According to 
Scott, the historical geocultural setting of Chinese-shaped Buddhism 
versus Indian-shaped Buddhism echoes the present geopolitics of 
regional competition between Beijing and New Delhi.  
Overall Findings  
As Cui has argued,  
in a region where historical animosities remain high, NTS issues 
can avoid sensitive areas and find common ground for coopera-
tion that traditional security approaches would be unable to envis-
age. Thus against a background of longstanding and deep-rooted 
distrust and sensitivities in traditional security areas, by identifying 
a functional area of cooperation NTS provide[s] an important 
desecuritising mechanism to reduce and calm regional tensions 
arising from history and territorial disputes. (Cui 2013: 886) 
However, this assessment seems to not apply to the case of Sino–
Indian relations. As the four individual articles in this volume have 
maintained, each shared NTS issue under analysis certainly has the 
potential for enhanced cooperation between China and India. Also, 
the articles have found that some of this potential has in effect been 
transformed into actual cooperative behaviour between both sides. At 
the same time, though, the individual contributions agree that the 
competitive features of the various NTS areas scrutinised in this vol-
ume have been prevalent and essentially more significant than the 
cooperative elements.  
What is more, if we return to the other NTS concerns outlined 
previously in this introduction, the account of the water–food–energy 
nexus, climate change, and terrorism, though it must remain super-
ficial at this point, seems to corroborate the findings in the four indi-
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vidual articles. Water was identified above as the gossamer in the 
water–food–energy nexus. However, it is above all the field of joint 
water-resources management where China and India have made the 
least progress to date. The cooperation on this front has been mod-
est. For example, both sides have in the past inked and renewed 
memoranda of understanding on the sharing of hydrological data on 
some of their major shared rivers. Moreover, in 2006, a bilateral ex-
pert-level mechanism was established, and has since been a platform 
to discuss issues such as data provision and emergency management 
vis-à-vis the transboundary rivers (Ho 2016: 190). But China and 
India have not made any headway on more sensitive issues of joint 
water-resources management, particularly water allocation. This situa-
tion has led two contributors (one Indian, one Chinese) to a recently 
edited book on current Sino–Indian relations to reach the following 
sobering conclusions: “water has emerged as a contentious issue be-
tween India and China” (Sinha 2016: 167) and  
the lack of a comprehensive framework between China and India 
for managing their shared water resources is a source of instability 
in Sino-Indian relations. (Ho 2016: 182)  
It goes without saying that at least to some extent the China–India 
water rivalry has also negatively affected cooperation on food pro-
duction and renewable energy. In particular, large-scale dam building 
in major shared river basins has resulted in food-versus-energy ten-
sions (Biba 2016: 59–61).  
China and India’s water rivalry has furthermore had an adverse 
impact on the joint fight against climate change in the Himalayas. As 
climate change in the Himalayas is particularly linked to glacial melt-
ing, there is increasing uncertainty about the future regional water 
system. This, however, seems to have aggravated zero-sum thinking 
on water, rather than having attenuated it (Wirsing, Stoll, and Jaspar-
ro 2013: 42). At the international level, to be sure, both sides certainly 
have a record of cooperation on climate change that is more decent 
than in most other NTS areas. Nevertheless, as Bajpaee has argued,  
notwithstanding the Joint Statement on Climate Change that was 
concluded between China and India in May 2015, there is a grow-
ing divergence between China and India on climate policies […]. 
The fact that both countries are at different stages of development 
has prompted this divergence of climate policies. (Bajpaee 2015: 111) 
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On the issue of counterterrorism, China and India have held an an-
nual dialogue since 2002. While this dialogue did not yield any tan-
gible results for many years, some progress was made on Afghanistan 
in connection with the drawdown of Western forces in 2014. Both 
Beijing and New Delhi have emphasised the need for peace and sta-
bility in Afghanistan in order to contain the spread of Islamic terror-
ism in the region. Both sides have also agreed that a regional counter-
terrorism approach, through the SCO, is necessary. However, the 
obstacles to such cooperation between China and India remain high. 
As Pant (2013) has stated, the road to stability in Afghanistan passes 
through Pakistan, and China has few incentives to challenge the Paki-
stani security establishment’s traditional adversarial mindset vis-à-vis 
India. 
As a result, the overall picture regarding shared NTS concerns 
between China and India to a large extent echoes the situation in the 
TS realm: competition is pronounced and conflict possible, while 
cooperation can hardly leave its mark in any considerable and sus-
tained way. This is true not only for the purely bilateral relationship 
between Beijing and New Delhi, but also in multilateral venues in-
cluding subregional organisations such as the SCO, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as well as broader fora such 
as BRICS and the G20: “the China-India polygonal engagement […] 
is a statement of strategic opposition and rivalry rather than any pre-
tence at real multilateral collaboration” (Panda 2013: 670). For the 
time being at least, the findings of this volume therefore also preclude 
hopes that NTS might have a noticeable positive effect on the pro-
tracted TS issues plaguing China–India relations.  
When we speculate on the reasons for the failure of NTS prob-
lems to spur (markedly) enhanced cooperation and mitigate TS ten-
sions in the Sino–Indian dyad, the specific and very close linkage 
between TS and NTS issues as far as relations between Beijing and 
New Delhi are concerned comes to mind. More precisely, what can 
be witnessed in all empirical analyses, and what has also been implicit 
in the individual articles, is a kind of “overlay” of TS threats over 
(most) NTS concerns in China–India relations. For example, water-
resources management, including hydropower development, in shar-
ed transboundary river basins is overlaid by the unresolved boundary 
issues; the shared Buddhist culture is overlaid by existing territorial 
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disputes in connection with Tibet as well as by great-power rivalries 
in third countries; joint anti-terrorism efforts are overlaid by the 
complex and divisive “Pakistan factor,” with further links to nuclear 
proliferation issues; and cooperative anti-piracy initiatives are overlaid 
by simmering geostrategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. As 
regards economic issues, the fact that trade and investment are hugely 
imbalanced underpins images of rivalry and competition in the TS 
sector as well as general perceptions of mistrust. As TS threats ob-
viously continue to carry much more weight in Sino–Indian relations 
than do NTS problems, it seems that the former stifle cooperation on 
the latter. NTS therefore needs to be delinked from TS. This would 
mean that NTS concerns could, as a first step, better live up to their 
undoubted potential of promoting enhanced and more sustained 
cooperation between China and India and, as a second step, possibly 
even contribute to building trust between both sides. This, in turn, 
would be conducive to reducing the two countries’ long-standing TS 
problems. In practice, however, such a delinking process appears 
difficult to implement for the time being.  
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